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WHY THE HURRY TO REGULATE AUTONOMOUS
WEAPON SYSTEMS-BUT NOT CYBER-WEAPONS?
Kenneth Anderson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Debates over the international legal regulation of autonomous weapon
systems (AWS) range in their proposals from a total, preemptive ban to regulation
under the existing process of legal weapons review as found in the law of armed
conflict (LOAC).' Debates over the proper mechanism by which to undertake such
regulation range in their proposals from a brand new treaty by which to enact a ban
on such weapons, to an unfolding emergence of shared norms among states and
their militaries under the processes of LOAC legal weapons review, with the
possibility of some new treaty codifying those norms remaining an open question
for the present time.2 At the diplomatic level, agitation for some form of treaty has
resulted in informal expert meetings at the United Nations (U.N.) in Geneva at
Germany's invitation to discuss how a possible new Protocol to the existing
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) might enshrine, in
international law (for states that become party to such a protocol a ban) or else
some other form of regulation short of a complete ban.
The intervention offered by this brief paper is limited merely to asking two
questions: (1) why the urgency to create an international treaty regime to regulate
what are thus far merely hypothetical AWS?; and (2) why the urgency to create a
new treaty regime for AWS (whatever its content, total ban or less sweeping
regulation), given that in sharp contrast o AWS, cyber-weapons actually exist;
have actually been used as weapons; and are in fact proliferating rapidly? Yet for
all that, states show little or no appetite, as they do with AWS, to take up treaty
*Kenneth Anderson is professor of law at Washington College of Law, American University,
Washington D.C. (kanders@wcl.american.edu). He thanks his frequent co-author on autonomous
weapon systems issues, Matthew C. Waxman, for discussion of ideas in this paper, though all
errors are Professor Anderson's alone. Thanks also to Duncan Hollis, all those at Temple
University Beasley School of Law who helped organize its meeting on emerging weapon
systems, and the participants in the meeting.
1. See Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch Coordinator, Campaign to Stop Killer Robots,
Statement to the UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International
Security (Oct. 16, 2015) (transcript available at http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content
/uploads/2015/10/KRCStatementUNGAI_160ct2015.pdf) (advocating for a ban on autonomous
weapons); Kenneth Anderson et al., Adapting the Law ofArmed Conflict to Autonomous Weapon
Systems, 90 INT'L L. STUD. 386, 398-406 (2014) (arguing for regulation under LOAC).
2. See, e.g., Anderson et al., supra note 1, at 398-406 (asserting that without a new treaty
any new weapon system must still comply in its design and usage with LOAC and discussing the
regulation of AWS under LOAC).
3. See 2015 Meeting of Experts on Laws, THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA,
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/6CE049BE22EC75A2Cl 257C8D00513E2
6?OpenDocument (last visited April 9, 2016).
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negotiations to address the risks that cyber-weapons and cyber-warfare pose today,
in the here and now.4
The appetite to take up one, yet not the other is curious and puzzling. This
paper examines some possible reasons for this dissimilarity of response to
emerging weapon technologies. It does so mostly by comparing features of AWS
and cyber-weapons and drawing certain (provisional, not proven) conclusions-
takeaways-about what these features imply should be done regarding regulation
by international legal processes at this point in each technology's development.
The discussion opens, however, by briefly describing what kinds of weapon
systems the article means under the term "AWS;" it is a definitional prior of the
paper as to what technology is under discussion here. It also seems useful to clarify
two additional normative and factual priors that I bring to the table with respect to
AWS and their possible regulation, so as not to confuse them with comparative
discussion of AWS and cyber-weapons. One is a brief statement of my view of the
normative status of AWS, as such, in the conduct of hostilities. The other is my
view as to whether the weapons under discussion are, or could meaningfully be,
genuinely autonomous: what does "autonomous" mean in the context of weapon
systems and, indeed, does it mean anything coherent a all?
II. THREE PRIORS ABOUT AWS
A. What Kinds ofSystems Are at Issue in Today's Debates Over A WS and
What Is Special About Them With Regards to LOAC Weapons Review?
The weapon systems that are (or ought to be) at the center of today's debates
over the regulation of autonomy do not include every weapon that might, in some
abstract sense, be thought of as able to act without an immediate human action to
trigger its firing. In a purely abstract way, for example, "dumb" anti-personnel
landmines might be understood as "autonomous," in the minimal sense that once
emplaced, they will explode in reaction to some trigger, such as a footfall,
potentially long after their emplacement.
In the meaning of this paper, however - and indeed, in informed discussion
today - these kinds of passive systems are not regarded or debated "autonomous
weapons," principally because they do not "target" or, more exactly, they do not
"undertake" to target anything at all.6 The legal regulation of such passive,
automatic weapons (which include weapons other than landmines) might range
from requiring restrictions on their battlefield use to outlawing them altogether as
inherently indiscriminate. Whatever one's view of that, in the context of this
discussion, there is nothing in their capabilities and limitations as weapons that
4. Jordan Peagler, The Stuxnet Attack: A New Form of Warfare and the (In)applicability of
Current International Law, ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L., 399, 428-29 (2014).
5. Mary A. Ferrer, Affirming Our Common Humanity: Regulating Landmines to Protect
Civilians and Children in the Developing World, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 135
(1996).
6. See id. at 156-57, 159.
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poses any special challenge to the law of weapons and legal weapons review.
By contrast, the weapon systems that matter in this discussion are those that
are capable of "undertaking to target" in more than merely a passive, abstractly
reactive way. That does not, by itself, make them legal systems, or systems that
can be used lawfully in every battlefield environment.' But it does define them as
AWS for purposes of this discussion because they incorporate artificial intelligence
(Al)." The present and future capabilities of Al to undertake targeting in the
meaning of the Department of Defense (DoD) definition of "full autonomy,"9 - to
make a target selection and to undertake to engage it with a weapon - which
might or might not be sufficiently robust for any given system to comply with
LOAC requirements in given environments and uses, raises questions about
capabilities that do not arise with respect to passive, merely abstractly autonomous
systems, such as landmines.0
These questions are old as far as the law of weapons is concerned, but the
technology is, or at least appears to be, progressing so as to render the perennial
legal questions about weapons new and unique. The Al in these systems, in
combination with other elements of the technology, does raise new and unique
questions with respect to their promise as well as their possible risks. The core
concern about them (shared by everyone in the AWS debate, irrespective of
whether they favor some radical, preemptive ban or instead believe they can be
regulated through LOAC weapons reviews of particular systems) is not the
concern exemplified by landmines, viz., they fail tests of discrimination because,
in the relevant legal sense, they merely react, do not meaningfully target, and in the
requisite legal sense cannot be "aimed.""
The fundamental weapons law concern, rather, is that such systems
potentially over-promise their Al capabilities to undertake lawful targeting (as
always, with respect to the particular uses and battlefield environments for which
7. See Michael N. Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian
Law: A Reply to the Critics, HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 11 (Feb. 5, 2013, 2:07 PM),
http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Schmitt-Autonomous-Weapon-Systems-and-
IHL-Final.pdf ("The inability of the weapon systems to distinguish bears on the legality of their
use in particular circumstances . . . .").
8. See Kelly Cass, Autonomous Weapons and Accountability: Seeking Solutions in the Law
of War, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1017, 1025 (2015) ("The legal fear associated with fully
autonomous weapons is that, due to the robot's evolved reasoning, humans will not be able to
predict the robot's actions.").
9. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 3000.09, AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS 13-14
(2012) [hereinafter DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09] (defining autonomous weapon systems); see also
Cass, supra note 8, at 1024 (providing a description of fully autonomous robots).
10. See Cass, supra note 8, at 1025 (indicating that the legal fear of fully autonomous
weapons stems from the fact that humans cannot always predict the weapons' effects).
11. See Paul J. Lightfoot, The Landmine Review Conference: Will the Revised Landmine
Protocol Protect Civilians?, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1526, 1530 (1995) ("Because landmines do
not explode until their victims approach, a mine cannot be aimed at a specific target . . .
(footnote omitted).
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they are designed and in which they are used).1 Put in the more general language
of design in social robotics (not just weapons) these systems potentially over-elicit
trust and reliance by their human users (planners of operations, operators in the
field, and other human actors) beyond what they are capable of delivering in a
given situation within the requirements of law."
AWS in the sense of something new and unique by reason of their Al
capabilities do not exist yet, it is widely agreed, at least not in the sense of the DoD
definition of a "fully autonomous" weapon that, once engaged, is able to select its
own targets and engage them without further human intervention.4 Systems that in
a more limited sense do exist, such as Israel's Iron Dome missle defense system"
against rockets and missiles, or U.S. ship protection systems16 against missile
attacks (without which, it bears noting, a naval vessel and all souls aboard might be
sent to the bottom in the opening naval engagement)." Yet for all the automation,
even autonomy, they are still limited insofar as they remain "human-on-the-loop"
systems-those characterized by the presence of a human operator who, in
principle, can intervene to override the system's automated operation.1
8
Since these "really-existing, really-deployed" systems are designed as
defenses against threats typically moving at beyond-human cognitive response
speeds, they of necessity might be on-the-loop rather than in-the-loop systems-
and the human operator truly "on" the system only in a limited, more decorative
12. See Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, "Out of the Loop ": Autonomous
Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 231, 243-44 (2013)
(discussing when autonomous weapons might be legally used on a battlefield).
13. See Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy Implications, 36
CARDOZO L. REV. 1837, 1860, 1862 (2015) (discussing the problem that humans can place too
much faith in computers and explaining that even robots such as Roomba cleaning robots are
autonomous).
14. See Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 12, at 266 ("Despite potential advances in artificial
intelligence, autonomous weapons systems will be unlikely to be capable of performing such
subjective evaluations for the foreseeable future."); see also DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09, supra note
9, at 13-14 (defining autonomous weapon system).
15. See Israel Defense Forces: Iron Dome Missile Defense System, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR.,
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/IronDome.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2016)
(explaining that the Iron Dome ,missile defense system is a response to the threats that Israel
faces from rockets and mortar shells fired by Palestinian terrorists in Gaza).
16. See USS Benfold Receives First Install of Shipboard Protection System, U.S. NAVY
(Feb. 5, 2008), http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.aspstoryid=34778 (explaining that the
shipboard protection system uses radar and cameras in order to identify and engage threats from
high-speed seaborne craft).
17. See, e.g., Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 12, at 236; MK 15 - Phalanx Close-In
Weapons System (CIWS), U.S. NAVY (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact
display.asp?cid=2100&tid=487&ct-2; John Pike, MK 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System
(CIWS), FED'N AM. SCIENTISTS (Jan. 9, 2003), http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/weaps/mk-
15.htm (describing a defense system that can automatically engage anti-ship missiles).
18. See William C. Marra & Sonia K. McNeil, Understanding "The Loop": Regulating the
Next Generation of War Machines, 36 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1139 (2013) (explaining the
loop system).
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than real, way." Even so, the limits of these systems' capabilities (including the
cognitive limits of the on-the-loop operator, as well as the limits of the battlefield
environments in which they can lawfully be used) have been evaluated
systematically under the process of legal weapons review for years, at least with
regards to such systems fielded by the United States or Israel.2' In that regard, at
least some weapon systems, in at least some battlefield environments, and at least
for some combat uses, can be characterized as "fully autonomous" in practical
operational terms (despite the person "on-the-loop").2' This is, of course, because
of the faster-than-human speeds with which they necessarily select and engage
targets.22 The legality of their use in the environments for which these types of
"fully autonomous" weapons were designed and fielded is not seriously at issue.23
Given the actual facts of existing, arguably "autonomous" weapons, and the
acceptance of their legality as well as acceptance of the process of assessing their
legality under the existing law of weapons,24 there would seem to be a heavy
burden on those desiring some radical break with the existing law of weapons and
its processes. What exactly in the overall, existing framework of legal weapon.
reviews requires such radical changes to the existing law of weapon reviews?
Radical, that is, in the sense of either demanding a categorical ban on the whole
category of supposedly autonomous weapons, or else insistence that new,
fundamental requirements of law be grafted - vivisected, more accurately - onto
LOAC ("meaningful human control," to start with) that are not already part of
LOAC's fundamental principles of military necessity, discrimination,
proportionality, and humanity.2 5
It is almost certainly true that the technical requirements of legal weapons
19. See Schmitt, supra note 7, at 13 ("[A] man in the loop is not a panacea during situations
in which it may be difficult to distinguish civilians and civilian objects from combatants and
military objectives.").
20. See id at 4 ("U.S. forces have operated two human-supervised autonomous systems for
many years .... ).
21. See Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 12, at 280 (indicating that humans are never really
out of the loop).
22. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC HARv. L. SCHOOL,
LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST HUMAN ROBOTS 19 (2012), https://www.hrw.org/sites
/default/files/reports/armsl 1l2ForUpload 0_0.pdf (indicating fully autonomous weapons could
process more information and faster than humans could); see also Schmitt & Thurnher, supra
note 12, at 239 (indicating future computing capabilities of autonomous weapons will be much
faster than today's military systems).
23. See Schmitt & Thurnhur, supra note 12, at 243-44 (describing how guns can be used
both lawfully and unlawfully). As Schmitt and Thurner note, human targeting officers in U.S.
forces sometimes employ sophisticated software programming to estimate likely collateral
damage from the employment of a particular munition in particular circumstances, given
assumptions about a variety of factors. Id. at 267.
24. See id. at 243 ("There is universal consensus that the law of armed conflict applies to
autonomous weapon systems.").
25. See Schmitt & Thurnhur, supra note 12, at 280 ("Virtually every rule of the law of
armed conflict reflects a balancing by States of two seminal factors-military necessity and
humanitarian concerns.").
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review will need (indeed might already stand in need of) adjustment to take
adequate account of the performance of complex, software driven systems as well
as methods of its evaluation;26 incorporation of reliability engineering and
performance/error standards measured, for example, in risk-probability terms that
are not necessarily those used by military lawyers;27 and other changes in process
such as ensuring that legal weapons review is incorporated into the design
requirements of the system from the outset.& But such evolutionary changes in
legal weapons review, changing as technology advances, is nothing new in
LOAC.29 Granted that increasingly robust Al incorporated into weapon systems
raises new and unique issues, it remains opaque what in the process of weapons
review has shown itself to be inherently incapable of adapting and responding to
change, specifically, changes in technology.
This definitional discussion of AWS and the question of what makes it special
so as to supposedly require whole new ways of dealing with it has been expressed
at greater length than the three remaining "priors" (below). This is on account of
its centrality in the debate over whether there is anything special about AWS that
would require the relatively immediate (even before the real emergence of such
AWS) elaboration of new international law based on radical new norms-including
by comparison to cyber-weapons and cyber-warfare.30
B. Normative: Rejecting the Call for a Total, Preemptive Ban on A WS, or a
New Fundamental Principle of Meaningful Human Control for A WS
To state plainly my own normative views up front, I believe that calls for a
total, preemptive ban by international NGO advocacy groups - the Stop Killer
Robots campaign,3 notably-are a serious mistake. A moral mistake, moreover,
because such a ban would take away the possibility of utilizing technological
advances (that, to be sure, might or might not come about) that might have many
important benefits-improved compliance with LOAC, and lessened harm on the
battlefield for both civilians and combatants. We have an affirmative moral
obligation to try and wring out of advancing automation, robotic, and Al
technologies whatever net benefits might be had. While those and other arguments
against a total, preemptive ban will not be discussed further here, and in-depth
discussion regarding those arguments can be found in another writing of mine,
along with co-authors Matthew C. Waxman and Daniel Reisner.3 2
26. See id. at 270-76.
27. See, e.g., id. at 261 (stating that armies are required to select the means of warfare likely
to cause the least harm to civilians and civilian objects without sacrificing military advantage).
28. Schmitt, supra note 7, at 28.
29. See generally Darren M. Stewart, New Technology and the Law of Armed Conflict, 87
INT'L L. STUD. 271, 284 (2011).
30. See generally Anderson et al., supra note 1.
31. Learn, CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/learn/
(last visited April 9, 2016).
32. See Anderson et al., supra note 1.
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Similarly, for reasons explained elsewhere as well, I regard current calls to
insert a new standard of "meaningful human control" with respect to AWS" to be
either redundant, because any consequences of the concept are already part of
LOAC, or else gravely inconsistent with the existing fundamental principles of
LOAC. 34 If the proposed meaningful human control principle is to mean anything
not already part of LOAC's four fundamental principles," it would have to be
because it requires something on the front end of targeting-viz., some human
involvement, often justified by reference to inherent human dignity, expressed in a
prohibition against being targeted entirely by a machine." But this creates the
possibility, and very likely near certainty, of grave inconsistency with LOAC's
fundamental principles. Those fundamental principles are not solely about the
protection of dignity, but rather focus on the protection of human beings on the
battlefield by deliberate reference to the effects of weapons and every other means
or methods of war. The focus of these principles is not to create some (quite
possibly) new and inconsistent principle insisting, without regard for
consequences, that targeting must involve a "who" and not just a "what,"
irrespective of what is likely to produce most discriminating and least harmful
effects."
33. For examples of those who have proposed an additional requirement of "meaningful
human control" to the existing laws of war on autonomous weapons, see Bonnie Docherty,
Taking on "Killer Robots, " JUSTSECURITY.ORG (May 23, 2014), http://justsecurity.org/10732/
guest-post-killer-robots/; Jonathan Fowler, UN Talks to Tackle Potential Killer Machines, TIMES
OF ISRAEL (May 13, 2014), http://www.timesofisrael.com/un-talks-to-tackle-potential-killer-
machines/; Steve Goose, Director of the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch, Statement To
the Convention on Conventional Weapons Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous
Weapons Systems (May 13, 2014) (transcript available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2014
/05/13/statement-convention-conventional-weapons-informal-meeting-experts-lethal-
autonomous); Killer Robots: UK Government Policy on Fully Autonomous Weapons, ARTICLE 36
(Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.article36.org/weapons-review/killer-robots-uk-government-policy-on
-fully-autonomous-weapons-2/; Memorandum for delegates at the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons (CCW) Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems
(LAWS), ARTICLE 36 (May 13-16, 2014), http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/
A36-CCW-May-2014.pdf.
34. Anderson et al., supra note 1, at 396-97.
35. GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW IN WAR 251-86 (2010) [hereinafter SOLIS]. The four listed principles are distinction,
military necessity, unnecessary suffering, and proportionality. Id.
36. See Mind the Gap: The Lack of Accountability fbr Killer Robots, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Apr. 8, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/04/09/mind-gap/lack-accountability-killer-
robots (arguing against autonomous weapons both through the argument that the decision to kill a
human being should not be left to a machine as well as the argument that AWS escape
accountability).
37. See Schmitt, supra note 7, at 24; see also JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, U.S. A.F.,
AFI51-402, LEGAL REVIEWS OF WEAPONS AND CYBER CAPABILITIES 3.1.1, 3.1.2 (2011)
(providing technical legal guidance for the legal review of weapon systems, specifying the scope
of legal review of weapons to encompass both specific treaty rules and customary law rules
regarding the use of the weapon, and considering, even in the absence of an express prohibition,
whether the weapon is of a nature to inflict superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering upon
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C. "Autonomy" is Not Categorical, but is Instead a Matter ofDegrees of
Automation/Autonomy, and is a Matter ofAutonomy With Respect to Particular
Functions and Not Necessarily the Weapon System as a Whole
The debate over "autonomy" and what it means in AWS has been seriously
distorted by the view that autonomy is a categorical attribute of a weapon system.
It is not autonomous, or it can be semi-autonomous, or it can be fully autonomous-
to use the DoD definition, which has been widely adopted by many in the AWS
debate, including many in the ban campaign generally, who call for bans on "fully
autonomous weapons."" The categorical, essentially "is" or "is not" definition is
fundamentally flawed in three ways. First, it puts the analytic attention on the
machine and its capabilities, as though it were somehow independent of human
beings - the human beings who designed and programmed it, and the human
beings who, in the case of a weapon system, determine the criteria, with greater or
lesser specificity, for its target selection and the conditions of its engagement.
Second, the categorical definition treats the weapon system, the machine, as
autonomous or not,9 rather than recognizing that the "system" is always a human-
machine dyad, and as a consequence, the degree of autonomy is a matter of the
degree of human involvement, including at what stage that human involvement
takes place.4 0 Autonomy is incremental in relation to a human role that is always
present, if only in the background by reason of a human designer and programmer.
Third, the categorical definition-and even a definition of autonomy in
weapons that recognizes its incremental relationship to human roles in the weapon
system-fails to take account of the likelihood that parts of the system, in any given
design or general programming, or in any particular configuration for particular
operations with particular criteria, might be more or less autonomous, independent
of human involvement, with respect to one function but not others.4 1 The weapon
system, for example, might be autonomous with regard to targeting missiles in the
air, but not so with regard to targeting human beings. It might be autonomous with
regards to targeting and engagement in clear weather, but not with regards to
storms or rain. The target engagement process might be autonomous, in the sense
that the weapon might be guided by heat-seeking or GPS technology without direct
human monitoring or intervention once fired-while the target selection process
combatants and whether it has the capability of being directed against specific military objectives
-or if it does not, if it is of a nature that it could result in an effect on military objectives and
civilians, or cause an effect on civilian objects, without distinction).
38. DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09, supra note 9.
39. Id.
40. Paul Scharre & Michael C. Horowitz, An Introduction to Autonomy in Weapon Systems,
6 (CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC., Working Paper No. 021015, 2015), http://www.cnas.org
/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/Ethical%2OAutonomy%20Working%20Paper_021015_v02
.pdf; see also Schmitt, supra note 7 ("[A]ll autonomous systems are supervised by human
operators at some level . . . .").
41. See Schmitt, supra note 7, at 5-7 (discussing the idea that a fully autonomous system is
never completely human free, either the system designer or an operator would at least have to
program the system to function pursuant to specified parameters).
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might require that a human being select what target lists, on which the machine
will draw, are relevant to the operation in the first place. Calling something an
"autonomous" weapon requires a further question, "autonomous" with respect to
what function or activity?
More fundamentally, as David Mindell42 points out in his recent book, Our
Robots, Ourselves: Robotics and the Myths ofAutonomy (Viking 2015),
automation changes the type of human involvement required and transforms
but does not eliminate it. For any apparently autonomous system, we can always
find the wrapper of human control that makes it useful .... Every operator, when
controlling his or her machine, interacts with designers and programmers who are
still present inside it - perhaps through design and coding done many years
before .... How a system is designed, by whom, ad for what purpose shapes its
abilities and its relationships with the people who use it.4 1
With respect to AWS, particularly concerning accountability for its effects in
some battlefield environment, the fundamental issue is not whether there is an
"autonomous" machine-there is not, as Mindell says." It is a question of whether
our judgment as to what constitutes accountability under LOAC for the use of
weapons can be satisfied in a given circumstance by human roles consisting of all
41or some of the system's designers and programmers.
This is not to say that the machine is autonomous because speed of response
means that a human operator likely will not be able to override it in real time-but
instead that operators in battlefield engagement must necessarily rely on the
machine performing without malfunction, and more crucially, on the humans who
made it ready for its use. Whether that reliance is sufficient to establish
accountability in the sense of the laws of war or military discipline in any given
circumstance is open to debate. But it bears noting that human accountability, put
onto any individual person, in any military organization is always defined, and
frankly limited, by intense specialization of function and the elaborate division of
42. David A. Mindell is the Dibner Professor of the History of Engineering and
Manufacturing, amongst other titles, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. See David A.
Mindell, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY ENGINEERING SYSTEMS DIVISION (last
visited Apr. 20, 2016), https://esd.mit.edu/FacultyPages/mindell/mindell.htm.
43. DAVID A. MINDELL, OUR ROBOTS, OURSELVES: ROBOTICS AND THE MYTHS OF
AUTONOMY 5 (2015).
44. Id.
45. The roles in question relate to those determining its configurations and limits for use in
particular environments as well as those putting into it intelligence information gathered quite
apart from the machine or its programmers or operators to give it the basis for target selection.
The roles also relate to those establishing the relationship between machine's specified selection
and targeting limitations and the operation's rules of engagement. Finally, the question concerns
the roles of commanders and operators using it in a given battlefield environment, including their
training in its use and understanding of its capabilities and limitations, and including as well the
possibility that the operationally necessary speed of response might mean that, in practical terms,
they must let the machine perform as others have set it up to do. See generally Schmitt, supra
note 7.
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labor among humans.4  War is an irreducibly social activity, conducted by
irreducibly "corporate" actors, with the aim of making the whole greater than the
sum of the parts.
The commander on the field, the pilot in the aircraft, the sailors firing the
missile to a point hundreds of miles away-every one of these people depends on
the quite fallible performance of other specialized individuals of whom they will
frequently have no knowledge, and vice-versa.7 The supposedly autonomous
weapon system introduces no truly new element in that regard. Autonomous
actions of the machine in target selection and engagement apparently leave no
identifiable, individual human beings who bear real accountability for failures or
mistakes, innocent or negligent-but the same is true of any complex military
bureaucracy with specialized functions. The division of labor, distributing
functions beyond single actors, whether human or machine, is by definition the
fragmentation of responsibility.
These considerations raise serious challenges to the meaningfulness of
arguments regarding bans and regulations that are premised on categorical
definitions of autonomy, which ignore the system's relation to humans. Proponents
of the regulatory concept of a requirement of "meaningful human control" that can
slide higher or lower depending on circumstances such as the nature of the
battlefield, and so on, believe that they have captured this idea of a human-
machine dyad-what Mindell calls "situated autonomy."4 8 What these proponents
fail to acknowledge, however, is that anything relevant in the concept of
"meaningful human control," including one that that takes into account a sliding
scale of greater or lesser human involvement, is already captured by LOAC
principles insofar as the concept looks to effects of weapons on the battlefield.4 9
And any concept of meaningful human control that imposes new fundamental
requirements as a prior condition of targeting, whether by a machine or anything
or anyone else, independent of effects, is simply morally mistaken and deeply
inconsistent with LOAC."
46. See Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Fully Autonomous
Weapons, REACHING CRITICAL WILL, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/
critical-issues/7972-fully-autonomous-weapons (showing that that pinpointing accountability
onto a specific individual may be nearly impossible given the nature of AWS).
47. Kenneth Anderson, Comparing The Strategic and Legal Features of Cyberwar, Drone
Warfare, and Autonomous Weapons Systems, HOOVER INSTITUTION, (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www
.hoover.org/research/comparing-strategic-and-legal-features-cyberwar-drone-warfare-and-
autonomous-weapon-systems (describing standoff systems - where the operators can be
physically removed from the weapon).
48. MINDELL, supra note 43, at 9-10.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
50. See SOLIS, supra note 35, at 251-86 (discussing the four core principles of LOAC and
how they are effects focused).
26 [30.1
2016] WHY THE HURRY TO REGULATE AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS
III. COMPARING AWS AND CYBER-WEAPONS
A. From "Priors" to Comparisons of Weapons
The foregoing considerations discussed as priors, framing concepts about the
nature of AWS, might seem a lengthy preamble to getting to the questions that this
article aims to address-why a hurry to create new international law for AWS, but
not a similar hurry with respect to cyber-weapons and cyber-warfare? Without the
background discussion, however, the paramount questions of whether, when, or
how to regulate AWS through international law mechanisms risks distortion by the
misconception of an AWS as merely a machine in isolation. In reality, AWS is a
dynamic human-machine dyad in which autonomy is neither static nor an attribute
of the machine as such. Therefore, we now turn to the question of what
comparisons can be made between AWS and cyber, armed with a more adequate
understanding of what AWS means.
B. A List of Comparisons Between A WS and Cyber- Weapons
Cyber-weapons and cyber-warfare (cyber-weapons, for convenience) of
course are like AWS in that they have many evolving features. The comparisons
made below will not remain stable over time, as technology changes. Below, then,
is a list of similarities and differences.
The starting point of comparison is that cyber-weapons do exist, have been
used, and indeed are rapidly proliferating across state arsenals." By contrast, AWS
are still (in the relevant sense set out earlier in this discussion) a technology of the
future, not a weapon of today. Cyber-weapons are an "actually existing" weapon in
a way that AWS are not.
Both AWS and cyber-weapons offer the possibility of being "remote" or
"standoff' systems.52 The operator of the system in each case might be far away
from the place of the attack, perhaps even a continent away. It is true that an
AWS, for example, might be used by a combatant as a weapon system in the same
place where that person, unit, ship, aircraft, etc., is engaged in combat, but the
features of autonomy might mean that it can operate in certain circumstances
independently of the human operator, even if the human operator is standing next
to it-in those specifically autonomous functions (selecting targets and firing its
weapons) to whatever degree permitted by its capabilities and programming.
51. See Gordon Corera, Rapid escalation of the cyber-arms race, BBC, (Apr. 29, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-32493516 (discussing the growth of a potential cyber arms race);
see generally Daniel Cohen & Aviv Rotbart, The Proliferation of Weapons in Cyberspace, 5
MILITARY AND STRATEGIC AFFAIRS 59 (May 2013).
52. Anderson, Comparing The Strategic and Legal Features of Cyberwar, Drone Warfare,
and Autonomous Weapons Systems, supra note 47. "Remote" and "Standoff' systems are
synonymous, and refer to weapons systems at a remote distance from the place attacked,
potentially far away from any conventional military theater of operations. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Schmitt, supra note 7, at 3-7 (discussing autonomous functions of AWS).
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Autonomous operation in this way is also a form of this remoteness.
AWS is kinetic in its operation, while cyber-weapons are not." However, this
might not be true in all circumstances. Cyber-weapons might well have kinetic
effects, at least indirectly through their actions on an adversary's cyber-controlled
systems.5 6 But broadly speaking, AWS act kinetically in the physical world
directly, while cyber-weapons act in the cyber-sphere, though with the possibility
of causing serious (at the margin potentially catastrophic) harm to physical
infrastructure such as power grids, water systems and many interrelated systems,
as well as harm to network systems such as financial markets, banking or
government records or ledgers, or even the ability to access or operate them."
Although we describe these weapons systems as "autonomous," in important
ways cyber-weapons might often be even more "autonomous" in their behavior
than AWS. The cyber-weapon might necessarily act in ways that, in software
terms, meet the understanding of "autonomous," even the special definition of
autonomy in weapons-pre-programmed, yet able to adapt its behavior to engage in
its own target selection and target engagement." AWS is not unique in regard to
having the possibility of adaptive learning systems.
AWS are not self-replicating or self-propagating machines." They do not
create or re-create themselves, reproduce their physical selves, science fiction
novels aside.60 Cyber-weapons, by contrast, might be engineered to do so,
depending on the design of the weapon.6 ' As with biological viruses or reproducing
pathogens, they might spread (by design or through unanticipated consequences) in
unpredictable and potentially uncontrollable ways.
6 2
Cyber-weapons are systems that target an adversary's command, control, and
communications." They might also be programmed to attack logistical targets,
55. See Anderson, Comparing The Strategic and Legal Features of Cyberwar, Drone
Warfare, and Autonomous Weapons Systems, supra note 47 (comparing AWS and cyber-
weapons).
56. See Scott D. Applegate, The Dawn of Kinetic Cyber, 2013 5TH INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT, 2 (K. Podins, J. Stinssen & M. Maybaum eds., 2013),
https://ccdcoe.org/cycon/2013/proceedings/d2rls4_applegate.pdf (stating that kinetic cyber refers
to a class that can cause direct or indirect damage or harm).
57. Id. at 2, 9.
58. See Eric Messinger, Is it Possible to Ban Autonomous Weapons in Cyberwar? JUST
SECURITY, (Jan. 15, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/19119/ban-autonomous-weapons-
cyberwar/ (discussing how the likely targets of cyber warfare will be run by autonomous
systems).
59. See DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09, supra note 9, at 13 (defining AWS as needing human
activation and operation prior to working).
60. Id.
61. See Y.M. YUFIK, NETWORK SCIENCE AND CYBER SECURITY 76 (Robinson E. Pino, ed.,
June 14, 2014) (discussing how cyber-weapons can self-regulate and self-propagate).
62. See P. W. Singer, Stuxnet and Its Hidden Lessons on the Ethics of Cyberweapons, 47
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 79, 80 (2015), http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol47/issI/10/
(discussing a prior cyber-weapon that globally spread uncontrollably to unintended targets).
63. See The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, DEP'T OF DEF. 7 (April 2015),
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such as an adversary's civilian infrastructure systems, but their most direct use in
conflict is against these classic military targets.64 AWS might be designed or
programmed to target any of these directly and kinetically, to be sure-but AWS
might also be programmed to attack a wide variety of other military or civilian
targets in the physical world, including buildings or other physical targets that are
not connected to cyberspace, and so cannot be attacked with a cyber-weapon.
AWS and cyber-weapons are similar in that each relies on complex systems,
61and inherently non-transparent software engineering, in which assessment of the
systems' capabilities and limitations on the basis of its actual programming will
inevitably become more difficult as the weapon passes from the hands of its
designers into the hands of users, whether they are those programming its specific
rules of engagement for a specific operation, or whether they are the actual human
operators of the system during the engagement itself. Moreover, where the
programming is not only complex, but also features machine learning, probabilistic
or stochastic programming, or similar Al features, it is possible that either a cyber-
weapon or an AWS might result in unpredictable, non-deterministic behavior. *
Both AWS and cyber-weapons can be designed to make attribution of an
attack difficult.6 This is a consequence of remoteness, complexity, and other
features.6 ' That said, at least at present, cyber-weapons present far greater problems
of difficulty in attributing an attack than AWS (or AWS projected to exist one
day), if only because AWS operate in the physical world. But both AWS and
cyber-weapons have characteristics that make them useful in covert,
unacknowledged, and "hybrid warfare" operations.
Both AWS and cyber-weapons rely fundamentally on technologies that are, or
will be, ubiquitous in the civilian world.0 In neither case are their fundamental
technologies special to "weapons."" This is true for AWS with respect to the three
features usually taken to define a "robot" or "robotic machine" in the human social
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-strategy/Final_2015 DoDCYBER
STRATEGY for web.pdf (discussing cyber strategy against cyber threats targeted by
adversaries).
64. See id at 2 (discussing expected cyber attacks against infrastructure and military
networks).
65. Anderson, Comparing The Strategic and Legal Features of Cyberwar, Drone Warfare,
and Autonomous Weapons Systems, supra note 47 (detailing how AWS and cyber-weapons rely
on both civilian and military networks).
66. Id.
67. Id
68. See Corinne lozzio, The 10 Most Mysterious Cyber Crimes, PC MAG, (Sept. 26, 2008),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2331225,00.asp (discussing ten major unsolved
cybercrimes).
69. See Anderson, Comparing The Strategic and Legal Features of Cyberwar, Drone
Warfare, and Autonomous Weapons Systems, supra note 47 (mentioning that the shared
remoteness aspect of both weapons systems makes them difficult to detect and allows the
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world: sensors by which to "map" and "situate" itself in the physical world; Al
computing capabilities; and physical mechanisms by which the machine can move
and act directly in the physical world." These are essentially the same technologies
that will enable genuinely self-driving cars, for example, and many other emerging
robotic technologies.7 ' As for cyber-weapons, the overlaps of the technologies are a
fact of life now; the ubiquitous and embedded nature of cyber-based systems for so
74
many facets of life is a core reason why cyber-warfare has become possible. The
overlap of cyber with national defense and civilian life is also one of the reasons
that it is difficult to disentangle "cyber-security" in a civilian sense from "cyber-
71
weapon" in a military or national security one.
It is, and probably always will be, easier to devise, design, and deploy both
AWS and cyber-weapons that are indiscriminate rather than discriminate. This is
true of most weapons, but it is especially so in the case of complex, technologically
cutting-edge weapons.77 In the case of cyber-weapons, attempting to make a
weapon discriminating (including in ways that go beyond simply its LOAC
meaning) might mean significantly greater efforts, expenditure of limited human
capital resources, and money, not just in creating software-but also the intelligence
gathering in order to determine the nature of the system to be attacked, in part, but
also (if discrimination is desired) in order to know how the attack can be limited, if
it can be. In the case of cyber-weapons, parties might not want to invest in the
uncertain and costly attempt to make the weapon discriminate, if it even can be
done (and can be determined that it has been done in advance). In the case of
AWS, precision and discrimination are functions of enabling greater precision in
each of the robotic functions-sensors, cognitive computational capabilities, and
mechanical actions-and it is already much easier to design and field systems that
do not embrace advancing technologies that give greater precision but require
much more difficult and expensive engineering and production.75 But it is also true
that advances in the precision of weapons that might translate into increased
discrimination on the battlefield is almost certainly only available through
72. See Robotics: Facts, IDAHO PUBLIC TELEVISION, http://idahoptv.org/sciencetrek/topics/
robots/facts.cfm (last visited Mar. 21, 2016) (discussing the basic definition, history, and
components of a robot).
73. ROBERT 0. WORK & SHAWN BRIMLEY, 20YY: PREPARING FOR WAR IN THE ROBOTIC
AGE 25 (2014).
74. See Anderson, supra note 48 (explaining how the digital infrastructure of military and
civilian life has perpetuated cyber-warfare).
75. Id.
76. See Kenneth Anderson & Matthew Waxman, Law and Ethics for Autonomous Weapon
Systems: Why a Ban Won't Work and How the Laws of War Can, THE HOOVER INSTITUTION,
2013, http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/Anderson-WaxmanLawAnd
Ethicsr2 FINAL.pdf (explaining that indiscriminate systems are much easier to design and
build).
77. Id
78. See Robotics: Facts, supra note 72 (describing the parts and their functions of Al);
Anderson & Waxman, supra note 76 (explaining that discriminate AWS require more precision
in engineering).
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advances in robotics, automation, and machine programming.9 If an actor cares
about discrimination and reducing battlefield harms, technological advance in
precision is the only real possibility.
It might be the case-though not always or necessarily-that advances in
technology to make AWS more precise and discriminating in its effects will tend
to be "general" advances in the precision and discrimination of robot as a whole
system. These advances are, perhaps, more likely to constitute general advances
for the machine's abilities, applicable to other tasks. It might also be the case,
however, that much of the programming of a cyber-weapon to increase its
precision and discrimination is entirely unique to a particular target and operation,
and not usefully, or at least not easily, transferable to the software of other cyber-
weapons with entirely different targets and systems. I have some hesitation about
this hypothesis, however.
AWS and cyber-weapons differ in the extent of the advanced technical and
industrial base required to create and produce them, as well what they require to
successfully field and maintain them.so Existing weapons that are arguably a-form
of AWS-shipboard systems such as the Aegis Weapon System, for example-are
highly complex, computerized systems."' AWS, as it actually emerges, is not likely
to be less complex, expensive, and dependent upon a strong military-industrial
base. Although there is much discussion about an arms race and the proliferation of
weaponized Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) systems,82 it remains true that UAVs
in the full military sense, such as the Predator or Reaper, require a sophisticated
industrial base, not only to design and produce them-but also to maintain and
operate them." There are "drones" and there are "drones," in other words.
While leading states are capable of producing and fielding weaponized
UAVs-China, Russia, the big NATO states, Japan, South Korea, etc. -large-scale
military UAVs such as Predators or Reapers will not often, if ever, be found in the
hands of non-state actors, if they could even operate them successfully.
Moreover, most of the benefit of Predators, Reapers, and other large military
UAVs is found in their sensor capabilities for gathering intelligence through
persistent surveillance, not the ability to fire a weapon, which involve whole other
79. Id.
80. Anderson, supra note 48 (describing how the element of control differs between AWS
and cyber-weapons).
81. See AEGIS Weapon System Mk 7, MILITARY, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.
globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/systems/aegis-core.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2016)
(discussing the complexity of the Aegis Weapon System and its autonomous capabilities).
82. See Nicholas West, Global Drone Arms Race Spreading Quickly, ACTIVIST POST, (Aug.
22, 2011), http://www.activistpost.com/2011/08/drone-arms-race-heats-up-worlds-first.html
(discussing the global arms race surrounding drones to take the example of a related significantly




85. See Anderson, supra note 50 (noting the difficulty for non-State actors to use AWS).
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technological capabilities from the physical sensors themselves to the cognitive
processing capability to gather information out of their feeds.86 These
considerations will be true in many analogous ways for AWS as they gradually
emerge. By contrast, however, cyber-weapons-particularly ones that are not
concerned with discrimination-can be created by small teams of software
designers or even by individuals, by States or by non-State actors.
IV. "WHAT'S THE HURRY TO CREATE INTERNATIONAL LAW TO REGULATE
AWS, BUT NOT CYBER-WEAPONS?"
A. Hypotheses About the Rush to Regulate, Not Firm Conclusions
What might be gleaned from these comparisons of AWS and cyber-weapons,
with respect o the apparent urgency many in the international community seem to
share of the need to create new international law to govern AWS, but not cyber-
weapons? Here are several possibilities-more hypotheses than conclusions, that
should be noted.
Cyber-weapons are a far more prevalent national security concern today than
AWS." Cyber-weapons will continue to evolve and advance, and in that sense they
are still an "emerging" military technology-but, by comparison to AWS, they are
already solidly part of the equation of security and conflict today, for the United
States as well as for others.89 AWS, by contrast, though arguably in existence in the
form of the limited defensive weapons today-shipboard defense, for example, or
Israel's Iron Dome missle defense system,0 discussed earlier-are still a matter of
the future and require significant advances in technology.
That future will gradually draw nearer, by incremental advances in the
multiple technologies that AWS systems require, to be sure. The neat conceptual
distinctions used to define AWS in the abstract today (machines capable of
autonomously selecting/engaging its own targets) will not turn out to describe
usefully the continuum of weapons automation over time, or the other distinctions
86. West, supra note 80.
87. See Peirluigi Peganini, The Rise of Cyber Weapons and Relative Impact on Cyberspace,
INFOSEC INSTITUTE, (Oct. 5, 2012) http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/the-rise-of-cyber-
weapons-and-relative-impact-on-cyberspace/ (discussing the ability of States as well as
individuals to create and use cyber-weapons).
88. See Anderson, supra note 50 (arguing cyber-weapons are more dangerous than AWS
because of large-scale effects on real people).
89. See Danny Vinik, America's secret arsenal, POLITICO (Dec. 9, 2015, 4:57 AM),
http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/12/defense-department-cyber-offense-strategy-
000331 (discussing the rapid growth of cyber-weapons and their uses).
90. MK 15 - Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), U.S. NAVY (Nov. 15, 2013),
http:/www. navy.mil/navydata/fact display.aspcid=2100&tid=487&ct-2; Niv Elis, Iron Dome:
Defense at bargain price, THE JERUSALEM POST (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.inss.org.
il/uploadlmages/systemFiles/Iron%2ODome-%20Defense%20at%20bargain%20prices
253012041.pdf; see also Schmitt & Thumher, supra note 12, at 235-36.
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discussed earlier about the nature of machine autonomy.1 There are short to
medium predictions92 that will probably turn out to be broadly correct about the
capabilities of the technologies that will power AWS in that time frame. But the
actual systems themselves, their actual battlefield capabilities and limitations,
remain speculative.
The destructive capabilities of cyber-weapons, as they exist today, are far
greater than those of AWS, which after all are still essentially in the future.93 From
the standpoint of risk and threat, in other words, it is remarkably strange that
attention for a sweeping and essentially unenforceable ban on AWS, or even
international treaty regulation of AWS in advance of even having specific
technologies to regulate, is relatively large, while calls for similar treaty regulation
for cyber is not. (Why this might be is deferred to the next section of this
discussion.)
Even if AWS were available today, however, so that a direct comparison of
the destructive capabilities of such weapons were possible, cyber-weapons would
still likely be capable of far greater harm than AWS, because of such properties as
self-propagation and the possibility of uncontrollable effects.9 4 Science fiction
aside, AWS might be more capable of greater precision and discrimination on the
battlefield than existing ordinary weapons; any particular AWS might turn out to
be less capable in those terms, and hence more destructive than anticipated. But
even so, AWS are still battlefield weapon systems, physically present in this
battlefield, and not simultaneously replicable across many battlefields in short
order as a result of its programming alone." AWS are a physical, kinetic battlefield
weapon system-and, unlike some cyber systems, not one with potentially
uncontrollable effects beyond any particular battlefield.6
It is possible a sophisticated military could deploy AWS in large numbers-
especially if it could be produced cheaply and without regard to the requirements
of LOAC-causing severe harm to civilians. However, the harm caused by AWS
is unlikely to be greater than a military without AWS who is indifferent to the laws
of war. Militaries using area bombardment or other indiscriminate means of attack
with great kinetic power and no target discrimination already cause significant
damage.
Those new to the AWS debates often mistakenly believe that the strategic
91. See, e.g., DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09, supra note 9.
92. Many experts have predicted that AWS will become the norm on the battlefield, but the
expected timeline for that to happen is about twenty years. See Luke Muehlhauser, When Will AI
be Created?, MACH. INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH INST. (May 15, 2013), https://intelligence.
org/2013/05/15/when-will-ai-be-created/ (describing the varying predictions of the development
of Al).
93. See Messinger supra, note 56 (discussing the capabilities of cyber-weapons).
94. See David Raymond et al., A Control Measure Framework to Limit Collateral Damage
and Propagation of Cyber Weapons, NATO (2013), https://ccdcoe.org/cycon/2013/proceedings
/dI r2s6_raymond.pdf (discussing dangers of self-propagation and ways to limit it).
95. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 388 (noting AWS are battlefield systems).
96. See Schmitt, supra note 7, at 7 (noting AWS will not go rogue).
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military reason for developing AWS capabilities is as force multipliers, large
numbers of robotic troops controlled by a relatively small group of human
soldiers.7 The reality is that destruction (or military operations indifferent to
destruction or collateral harms) can be achieved with far easier, cheaper, and long-
existing technologies.98 One of the main reasons to develop AWS is speed. Speed
can be utilized either offensively to win an engagement, or defensively to respond
to an adversary's attack faster and prevent potentially disastrous harm. Another
primary factor motivating the development of AWS is that it can be operated
remotely, thus protecting one's own forces by removing them from the actual
battlefield.99 Lastly, the promise of increased precision motivates the development
of AWS because it has the potential to significantly reduce unnecessary battlefield
harms.'1 Of these reasons for the making the extraordinary investments in military
robotics required to create and field AWS that can perform unique battlefield tasks
or perform them in a uniquely valuable way, the only one that has emerged so far
is AWS to address the increasing speed and tempo of certain kinds of battle -
countering missiles and rockets."or
Cyber-weapons are far more likely to have effects, whether by direct targeting
directly or collaterally, on civilians and civilian objects than AWS, and in many
cases cyber-attacks are likely to have effects in many different places connected by
their cyber-links.0 2 With physical machines such as AWS, it is hard to see how
they have similar effects that might reach far beyond particular battlefields where
they are physically present. Moreover, cyber-technologies serve both civilian and
military infrastructure in ways that are today deeply intertwined and likely to grow
only more so."" In that case, whether cyber-attacks take place in the course of a
purely cyber-war; or whether they take place as acts of cyber-warfare embedded
within a larger conventional armed conflict; or whether they are aimed directly at
civilian infrastructure or are simply collateral effects of attacks on other targets,
civilian infrastructure of many kinds is highly vulnerable in cyber-warfare in ways
that is not likely to be true for AWS, if only because of the fact of physical
machine embodiment.'" The potential for serious harm as things stand today is,
97. See March of the robots, THE ECONOMIST (June 2, 2012), http://www.economist.com
/node/21556103 (discussing many robots that are used in tandem with humans, instead of as
replacements).
98. See Civilians Killed & Wounded, WATSON INST. INT'L PUB. AFFAIRS (Mar. 2015), http:
//watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human/civilians (noting most deaths in war come from
malnutrition and poor health care, rather than weapons).
99. See Michael W. Lewis, Drones and the Boundaries of the Battlefield, 47 TEX. INT'L L.
J. 294, 296 (Spring 2012) (discussing the benefits of developing AWS).
100. Id
101. See Elis, supra note 90 (discussing the effectiveness of Israel's Iron Dome system, and
AWS).
102. See Peganini, supra note 87.
103. See id. (asserting that vulnerable connections between systems are one of the main risk
factors for the population in handling cyber-weapons).
104. See id ("Different from what leads to a conventional attack, a cyber attack can be
conducted in a silent way in times of peace and this leads to having to consider the extremely
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and is likely to remain into the future, higher by orders of magnitude for cyber-
warfare by comparison to the destructive capabilities likely to be true of even
advanced and widespread AWS.
IV. So WHERE IS THE "BAN KILLER APPS" CAMPAIGN?
A. Why No Agitation to Ban Killer Apps?
If the foregoing hypotheses are at least approximately correct about
differences in the potential harms as things stand today with respect to cyber-
weapons and AWS, then the question posed by this article seems unavoidable.
Why does there not seem to be anything resembling a concerted push to create
sweeping new international legal regimes to outlaw cyber-weapons? Where is the
"Ban Killer Apps" NGO advocacy campaign, demanding a sweeping, total ban on
the use, possession, transfer, or development of cyber-weapons-all the features
found in today's Stop Killer Robots campaign?os
It will not do to say there is no campaign because there is no real way to make
it work, given the nature of cyber. It is not at all obvious that the same is not true
of the robotics technologies that are poised to enter the world of ordinary social life
as they simultaneously enter the world of weapons and national security. They are
essentially the same technologies applied in mildly different directions.'" States are
quite capable of pursuing AWS technologies in secret, and capable of signing onto
international treaties while secretly pursuing these technologies.7
B. Proliferation and Self-Replication
Moreover, cyber-weapons should raise far greater proliferation concerns.
They are a far more cost-effective weapon, given that cyber-weapons do not
require the same techno-industrial base to design and produce them. " Given that
they provide almost certainly greater destructive leverage and bang for the buck,
because of the ability to attack so many soft civilian targets in so many different
places at once; and given and the low barriers to entry compared to AWS, at least
if a party is indifferent to engineering for discrimination and precision in cyber-
targeting.'9 Beyond proliferation, by comparison to AWS, cyber-weapons should
also raise fears of the digital equivalent of biological warfare-self-replicating
cyber-weapons that, entirely unlike physical AWS machines, might have genuinely
insidious threat that requires a high level of alertness.").
105. See Ban 'Killer Robots' Before It's Too Late, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 19,
2012), https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/11/19/ban-killer-robots-its-too-late (discussing the
reasons for advocating against AWS).
106. See Anderson, Comparing The Strategic and Legal Features of Cyberwar, Drone
Warfare, and Autonomous Weapons Systems, supra note 47 (comparing the similarities of AWS
and cyber-weapons).
107. See Peganini, supra note 87 (noting the United States admits cyberspace is an area for
warfare, but is secretive about its programs).
108. See Peganini, supra, note 87.
109. See id. (discussing cost effectiveness of cyber-weapons).
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uncontrollable effects.110
Yet there is not an international advocacy campaign nor is there anything like
the excitement and agitation, the intense interest, evinced by states and their
diplomatic representatives in the U.N. two years ago, or the intense interest by
U.N. officials themselves."' There does not appear, in my perception of the
comparison of the two weapon types, to be anything like the sense of urgency in
the demand for new instruments of international law to govern cyber-weapons that
there appears to be in the case of AWS.
C. A Cautious Approach to Cyber Through State-to-State Discussions,
Informal Discussions Not Part of Treaty Processes, and Allowing the Emergence
ofBest Practice and Common Standards Among State
It is true that concerns over cyber-warfare have resulted in an explosion of
writing academic and policy venues."' The concerns about cyber-war and cyber-
warfare have resulted in one major expert effort to propose a coherent legal
approach within LOAC to address cyber-warfare."' This is, of course, the Tallinn
Manual, for which the eminent LOAC scholar Michael Schmitt served as reporter
and drafter of the book-length report.1 4 It is acknowledged to be a very significant
effort; the Tallinn process is now coming up with version two, taking into account
the great number of responses and comments on it."
5
It is possible that continued evolution of the Tallinn Manual might eventually
result in either a treaty setting out its terms as international law or (it seems to me
less likely) claims in the future that the Tallinn Manual (or certain of its parts) has
become customary international law. Yet still the question of this paper persists-
why no significant agitation by States or international advocacy NGOs for
immediate and sweeping international treaty law, given the relative magnitude of
the threats, particularly by comparison to the as-yet infant-embryonic, even-
technologies of AWS?
It is noteworthy that alongside the informal, unofficial expert group meetings
that gave birth to the Tallinn Manual, there has been discussion and debate within
and among some important states."'6 The U.S. government, specifically, the Obama
110. See Raymond et al., supra note 94 (noting the potential negative effects of cyber-
weapons).
11l. Chairperson of the Meeting of Experts, UN Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons, Report of the 2014 Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons
Systems (LAWS) T 20, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/% 28%20httpAssets%29
/350D9ABEDIAFA515CI257CF30047A8C7/$file/Report AdvancedVersionIOJune.pdf.
112. See, e.g., INT'L GROUP OF EXPERTS AT THE INVITATION OF THE NATO CooP. CYBER
DEFENSE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
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administration, has given some speeches and statements of policy and some
carefully phrased (i.e., revisable) statements of its legal views."' Additionally,
there have been important efforts to establish "best practices" promulgated by and
for States, and attempts to describe what might fall under "cyber-security" versus
"cyber-war and cyber-warfare.""' In my view, and by comparison to today's
discussions of AWS, therefore, states appear to be very cautious and hesitant to
initiate discussions that aim at binding treaties at this stage."'9 States are far more
interested in discussions conceived around more modest efforts to develop state
practice and flexibility with respect to evolving technologies, and allow broader
forms of inter-state agreement o emerge.120
One wonders-well, I wonder, just in case the point has not been driven home
enough--why the same approach does not appear to hold, or anyway hold with the
same caution, for creating grand treaty regimes with respect to AWS.
D. Speculative Hypotheses About the Lack ofAgitation for an Immediate,
Sweeping Cyber- Warfare Treaty, By Comparison to A WS
The relatively broader ability by many States today to create and use cyber-
weapons-their far lower barriers to entry, by comparison to AWS-causes States to
evaluate realistically their own concrete interests in possibly possessing such
weapons, for both defensive and offensive purposes.12 ' By contrast, the much
higher barriers to entry at this point in time for AWS mean that only a handful of
States are in a position to develop and field these weapons as the technologies
gradually emerge and mature.122 One possible consequence is that, at this stage, a
great many other States perceive an interest in restraining those few players with
the technological capabilities of developing AWS at this stage. One motivation
might be so that at least some of the "have-nots" have time and breathing-space to
catch up and become "haves." For others, restraining the United States as the
hegemonic actor in the world is reason enough. For still others, rent-seeking23 by
using the threat of creating international law in exchange for other benefits might
be a possibility.
For some States, internal politics might drive the government's position to
Apr. 18, 2016).
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., John Haller et al., Best Practices for National Security: Building a National
Computer Security Incident Management Capability, (June 2010), http://resources.sei.cmu.edu
/assetfiles/SpecialReport/2010_003_001_15137.pdf.
119. See, e.g., id.
120. See, e.g., id.
121. See Peganini, supra note 87 (explaining that the United States is not the only nation
investing in cyber warfare capabilities).
122. Id.
123. Rent-seeking is the use of a company, organization or individual's resources to obtain
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take up the cause of AWS rather than cyber-warfare. For example, perhaps in some
Western European countries, internal social movements that provide support to
international NGO advocates, combined with relative indifference on the part of
such governments to external security concerns (given the U.S. security guarantee
114
through NATO), leads to an embrace of a treaty ban (or a functional ban through
severe regulation) on AWS. This embrace, it should be said, need not be a rational
government decision taken by comparing the risks and possible benefits of AWS to
the risks and threats (already) posed by cyber-warfare. On the contrary, a
government that perceives no external risk to its own security might simply be
being willing to follow, without much attention to the actual content or
implications of policy, whatever internal social movements and civil society
organizations have embraced because they, in turn, merely follow without much
reflection or consideration whatever international NGO advocates happen to have
settled on as the cause de jour. In other words, governments in that happy, risk-free
position might just as easily have embraced agitation for a sweeping, immediate
treaty on cyber-warfare-but they did not because Human Rights Watch settled on
AWS rather than cyber-warfare.125
The fact that there are already really-existing cyber-weapons, indeed a flood
of them, and the fact that cyber-weapons have already been used, forces States to
grapple with the gritty detailed facts, known and unknown, about such systems,
both one's own and those of potential or actual adversaries. 12 It forces States, and
any expert advisers inside States' respective Ministries of Defense, to think
realistically both as to what the content of a meaningful treaty, addressed to
actually-existing, though rapidly evolving, cyber-weapons technologies, would
actually be able to say, as well as the very real knowledge with respect to existing
technologies that enforcement would be essentially unachievable. The fact of
actual technologies tends to concentrate the mind of the State with respect to what
a treaty would actually mean, and how it would be likely to hamper most precisely
those states that might agitate for it.
By contrast, the fact that AWS at this point in its technological development
remains in the abstract and in the future (even if it is approaching incrementally
and gradually)127 allows the debate over AWS and how an international law regime
would be conceived and articulated to remain at the level of sweeping, abstract,
and categorical principles. Such abstraction favors, of course, advocates of a ban,
or advocates of regulation stringent enough that it could easily be interpreted as
endorsing a ban.m8 Indeed, the fact that AWS is not on the table in concrete
124. NATO, Collective Defense -Article 5, (last updated Mar. 22, 2016) http://
www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_ 10496.htm.
125. Autonomous Weapons Systems: Five Key Human Rights Issues For Consideration,
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (2015), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/act30/1401/2015/en/
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126. See, e.g., Peganini, supra note 87.
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technologies that can be evaluated with respect to their particular capabilities
practically means that any treaty at this stage must consist of sweeping abstract
principles, rather than concrete rules that arise from the experience of actual
weapon systems and their particular technological possibilities and limitations.
The complexities of distinguishing between cyber-security and cyber-war,
between criminal acts and acts of war, within the context of difficult and
ambiguous attribution-and the fact that states already know this to be the case in
cyber-have made States aware of the great difficulties in defining exactly what one
proposes to regulate and what those regulations might mean in a binding,
permanent treaty." This leads, to some extent at least, a preference by States to
allow State practice to emerge and to reserve debates over new treaty law as a
matter for the future, following the emergence (if, of course, it does emerge) of
reasonably broad agreement over best practices, with regards to technologies in
their particular capabilities and limitations.3' AWS debates, at least at this stage,
seem inclined through a sense of moral and legal urgency, to bypass that process
and proceed directly or nearly directly to codification in one form or another.13 2
This seems to me an enormous legal policy mistake.
5. States committed to LOAC might decide that the long-run development of
stable rules for cyber-weapons-forms of regulation that are most likely to having
staying power-is most likely to emerge by letting the existing legal processes of
legal weapons review in LOAC/international humanitarian law (IHL) provide
evaluations of individual cyber-weapon systems by leading States, at least those
that actually perform legal weapons reviews. These are the concrete bases out of
which might emerge the bases of common standards among States. These reviews
begin, of course, with the fundamental principles of LOAC/IHL-as the whole body
of law does-but then descend into the granular features of design, performance,
reliability engineering, and so on in order to assess not merely the lawfulness of
the weapon, but far more importantly, the environments and uses to which it can
lawfully be put in conflict.'
It should be added-as Matthew Waxman, a professor at Columbia Law
specializing in in national security law and international law, and I have often
stressed in past writing-that the emergence of best practices and shared norms
among leading states, whether in cyber-weapons or in AWS, can only happen if
leading states are willing to share enough information to allow standards to
become "common" among them.
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VI. CONCLUSION
What has been offered in this article by way of explanation for why AWS
rather than cyber-warfare or cyber-weapons as the object of agitation for sweeping,
immediate international law consists of hypotheses, provisional explanations,
rather than firm conclusions supported by scads of evidence. It is hard to produce
evidence with regards to counter-factuals that are counter-factuals in no small part
because AWS is not yet on hand technologically with any great specificity or
granularity as to particular systems, and so assessing its nature is necessarily
speculative at this stage. Assessment of cyber-weapons-though the weapons are
quite real technologies-is also speculative, though for a different reason, viz., that
they are national security secrets of many different countries."' The underlying
features of the programming, as well as concrete information about the use of
cyber-weapons to date, is not reliably known, at least not so as to include a wide
sample of leading, technologically active states.
Nonetheless, if this paper has no other take-away, there is something
politically provocative and important to be explained about the gap in enthusiasm
for immediate creation of international law between the two. Part of the gap, I
believe, does indeed depend upon the sort of speculative hypotheses that the latter
half of this article offers in comparing cyber-weapons and AWS. But another part
of the gap, I believe, arises from conceptual confusions and misconceptions about
the nature of autonomy in robotic technology and Al generally that are addressed
in the first half of the paper.
There is an opportunity here to assist in at least possible establishment of
reasonably stable rules (capable of evolving as well) with regards to AWS. It is,
however and somewhat paradoxically, participation that consists, at least as far as
the creation of new international law, new treaty law, is concerned, a matter of
holding back rather than rushing in. The reflexive desire to start drafting
international law, rather than letting informal State-to-State processes take their
course, with far greater attention paid to the granular features of actual AWS and
their technologies as they emerge, is not likely to lead straight-away to the total
ban treaty sought by some that might, tragically, leave the technology and the
benefits that it might one day offer in reducing the harms of conflict still-bom.
Still-bom, moreover, without deterring in the least development, secretly or
otherwise, of such weapons by the world's less scrupulous States, and with little or
no pressure to address discrimination and precision by such States.
But the reach straight-away to establishing (in advance of actual weapons and
the technology undergirding them that can be evaluated by the processes of legal
weapons review in LOAC) a supposed "regulatory" treaty regime under the CCW
would almost certainly be an exercise in futility that, worse, might permanently
derail the attempt to come up with stable rules for addressing systems possessed of
increasingly sophisticated forms of machine autonomy. Futility in that it would
necessarily consist of abstract statements of principle, because there would be as
135. Id.
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yet no actual technology or experience with the weapon that would allow for the
concrete formulation of treaty rules grounded in experience. The conditions for
genuinely useful and effective regulation of AWS would, in my view, be
something that is many years down the road, and following on the cautious
development of State-to-State standards among friends and allies, and cautious
outreach to other states on the basis that the discussions are entirely provisional
and are not part of an effort to create an international law regime-at the first sign
of which States would treat what they say as hedged against the protection of their
interests. Best practices and shared standards do not emerge from that kind of
discussion.
A stable regime for regulating AWS, including the evolution of the
technology, would require something that international treaty processes cannot
provide in the first instance-the experience of States in developing the
technologies, developing weapons, and developing a base of experience in both the
technology and legal issues arising from the intense particularity and granularity of
weapons reviews to come to common standards for regulation based on actual
experience. Calls for international discussions, informal or otherwise, as part of
treaty or treaty review processes, is by many years premature.
